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abuses perpetrated by government entities, while a human
uring the 1990s there was an exponential increase in
rights commission generally addresses the actions of prithe establishment of national human rights institutions
vate entities and individuals as well as governmental conduct.
in Africa. As recently as 1989, only one African country had established some form of human rights monitoring
body. By the beginning of 2000, twenty-four African counThe International Community’s Role in Establishing
tries had provisions in their laws for national human rights
Human Rights Institutions
bodies. The United Nations and other funders in the interThroughout the past two decades, the international comnational donor community have directly encouraged and supmunity has greatly increased its focus on establishing national
ported, both technically and financially, the growth of these
human rights bodies in Africa. Promoting these national instiinstitutions. The international community lends its support
tutions has emerged as one of the UN’s most important
because it considers the process of establishing national
strategies for improving the protection of human rights in
human rights institutions to be an indication that a govthe region.
ernment is willing to abide by international human rights
To promote these institutions effectively, the United
norms. Also, African nations consider the establishment of
Nations created the Program of Advisory Services and Technational human rights bodies to be integral to international
nical Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights (Program
acceptance.
of Advisory Services) as early as 1955. In
Many human rights activists are,
1987, then-Secretary-General Javier
however, concerned that some of
Perez de Cuellar established the Volthese human rights bodies enable
untary Fund for Technical Cooperaabusive governments to cover up
tion in the Field of Human Rights (Volhuman rights violations. Both nonuntary Fund) with an eye toward
governmental and independent studstrengthening and supporting the work
ies on the effectiveness of national
of the Program of Advisory Services.
human rights bodies demonstrate
The Voluntary Fund was set up to estabthat an institution’s success depends
lish and offer technical support to
largely upon the existence and
national and regional institutions aimed
strength of particular legal, financial,
at implementing international stanpolitical, and social factors. Such facdards of human rights at the local level.
tors include whether democratic govThe program currently offers its serernance exists and whether the instivices to governments that are considtution is operationally independent
ering, or are in the process of estabfrom the government. Despite these
lishing, a national human rights
findings, there is little correlation
institution. The assistance that the Volbetween the funding and technical
untary Fund provides includes trainsupport offered by UN entities and
ing on effective investigation of human
international donors, and the actual
rights violations, conflict resolution,
effectiveness of a human rights insti- A young girl in Koidu, Sierra Leone.
obtaining and managing resources,
tution. Funding generally is available
conducting reviews and evaluations,
to any country that expresses an interand drafting reports for UN treaty bodest in establishing a national human rights body, regardless
ies. A regular UN operating budget and private donations
of the institution’s likelihood of success.
fund the program. Since 1988, the program has received $19
It is questionable whether international funding is spent
million in pledges and contributions, indicating the widewisely. Sierra Leone, for example, relied on international
spread support for its work.
funding to establish its national human rights body. The sucIn 1991 the UN International Workshop on National
cess of Sierra Leone’s human rights institution has been
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human
inconsistent. The ineffectiveness of human rights instituRights formalized UN assistance for national human rights
tions thus demonstrates that international funds and techinstitutions. The workshop produced guiding principles
nical support can be used ineffectively and not carefully
regarding the status, powers, and functioning of national
implemented. Although continued international support
human rights institutions. In 1993, the UN General Assemfor African human rights institutions is vital, it is crucial
bly endorsed these principles, which are known as the Paris
that such support not be given unconditionally. Rather, the
Principles. These principles constitute the fundamental
UN and international donors should carefully evaluate the
guidelines, which the UN uses to assist countries in estabeffectiveness of the entities they support.
lishing national human rights bodies. The guidelines enumerate the requisite factors for a human rights institution’s
effectiveness: (1) a founding constitutional or legislative
National Human Rights Institutions
statute; (2) a broad mandate; (3) an independent appointThere are two types of national human rights instituments procedure, with terms of office specified by law; (4)
tions: human rights commissions and ombudsmen. These
a pluralistic and representative composition; (5) regular
institutions have similar characteristics: neither institution is
and effective functioning; (6) independence from the execjudicial in nature nor has lawmaking abilities. Rather, both
utive branch; and (7) adequate funding. Further, the Paris
institutions play an ongoing advisory role regarding human
Principles place particular attention on the need for human
rights matters, at both the national and international levels.
The main difference between the two institutions is that an
continued on next page
ombudsman’s primary role is to monitor human rights
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Disadvantages of the International Community’s Support
for National Human Rights Institutions
The international community’s non-discriminatory disrights institutions to be empowered to make public statements
tribution of assistance poses a substantial problem to the
on their work.
development of effective human rights bodies. UnderUN support has not been the only impetus for the rise of
standably, the international community wants to encourage
these institutions. The creation of the African Charter on
concern about human rights not only in countries with good
Human and People’s Rights, which came into effect in 1986,
human rights records, but also in countries with poor records.
specifically encourages “. . . the establishment and improveYet in practice, the even-handed approach actively supports
ment of appropriate national institutions entrusted with the
weak commissions with little attempt to evaluate the effecpromotion and protection of the rights and freedoms guartiveness of these institutions or suggest how such instituanteed by the present Charter.” The recognition of the need
tions might be more effective. One could easily construe this
for national institutions as well as the general changes in the
international support as legitimizing weak human rights
African political and social landscape and growing internacommissions that operate to cover up serious governmental
tional pressure have greatly increased the profile of human
abuses. According to Human Rights Watch, many national
rights issues within Africa. Increasingly, African governments
commissions “. . . see [their] role as being a mouthpiece to
are realizing that international credibility is intimately tied
defend repressive government policies or to deny the existo improvements in their human rights records.
tence of abuses.”
Moreover, the failure to criticize weak commissions carAdvantages of Creating National Human Rights Institutions
ries with it negative repercussions. Rather than passively
International bodies often encounter problems related to
supporting government-established commissions that are
cultural relativism when they attempt to impose internanot always the most effective instruments for change, the
tional norms. Typically, the most effective education and
international community should be working actively to find
information campaigns are those that have been designed
ways in which their support will be
and carried out at the national level
most effective in bringing about
and are culturally sensitive. National
positive change in a country. The
human rights institutions meet this
The Office of the High Commissioner for
Office of the High Commissioner
criteria. By supporting the creation
Human
Rights,
however,
appears
to
be
for Human Rights, however,
of these national human rights instiappears to be extremely reluctant
tutions, the international commuextremely reluctant to publicly critique
to publicly critique weak human
nity is able to work actively toward
weak human rights commissions, although
rights commissions, although the
improving human rights standards
same office seems to criticize abuwithout having to struggle with
the same office seems to criticize abusive
sive governments openly. It is difdesigning and implementing a culgovernments openly.
ficult to discern the rationale
turally sensitive system for each
behind this reluctance. Conceivcountry. Further, by funding govably, the High Commissioner may
ernment-created institutions, the international donor comfeel that even an ineffective human rights institution exerts
munity does not need to be concerned about funding NGOs
pressure on a government that otherwise would not have
whose agendas might not be politically popular internaexisted. By characterizing its support as such, the UN justitionally or with the local government.
fies supporting the very existence of such an institution,
For these reasons, national human rights bodies are an
albeit a weak one. Further, the UN may be operating under
appealing means of promoting human rights. Much of the
the notion that it is more palatable to criticize a foreign
appeal lies in the inherent cultural sensitivity of the national
government than to criticize one’s programming. Yet the failentities. The UN’s technical support, however, potentially
ure to recognize and identify flaws precludes the possibility
impedes the cultural sensitivity of the national institutions by
of remedying and strengthening these institutions. Moreover,
virtue of its generic nature. The Office of the High Comthe international community appears to lend legitimacy to
missioner for Human Rights employs two assistance proceweak commissions.
dures to help countries establish human rights bodies. TheAdditionally, it is problematic that international fundoretically, the first procedure—the technical assistance
ing is not contingent on an institution’s effectiveness. Studprogram—integrates support for national institutions with
ies by both nonprofit organizations and legal scholars have
other forms of UN assistance.
demonstrated that the elements enumerated in the Paris PrinThe second assistance procedure is a Special Advisor on
ciples are vital to the creation of an effective national human
national institutions, regional arrangements, and prevenrights institution. There have, however, been few studies
tive strategies, whose role is to provide technical assistance
regarding whether national institutions funded by the interto governments in both creating and supporting human
national community actually meet the criteria established by
rights commissions. Special Advisors have enabled the UN
the Paris Principles. Although the technical assistance proto acquire a wealth of comparative knowledge, which has been
gram works to help institutions meet the technical stanused effectively in many countries. The Special Advisor assisdards, they do not guarantee effectiveness in promoting
tance procedure is not, however, without flaws. Because one
human rights. International funding should be tied to the
individual holds the position of Special Advisor, it is difficult
institution’s effectiveness in promoting human rights, thus
to obtain country-specific advice. It is unrealistic to presume
creating an incentive for effective human rights protection.
that one person could develop enough country-specific
It is still crucial for the UN to support these national
knowledge for each country in which a Special Advisor operinstitutions. Focusing attention on the creation of such
ates. Consequently, a Special Advisor’s advice is often generic.
human rights institutions helps bring human rights issues to
This problem could potentially be alleviated if the program
the forefront of international affairs. It is also vital that the
work of the technical assistance program and the country desk
international community refrain from passively supporting
officers were more integrated with the work of the Special
ineffective government-established institutions.
Advisor.
Human Rights, continued from previous page
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international funding is targeted and aimed at specific projects or goals. For example, in 1998 the UN Development Program (UNDP) awarded the NCDHR a U.S.$1.6 million grant
Sierra Leone
for a program entitled “National Awareness Raising ProAppalling human rights abuses occurred during Sierra
gram.” The program started prior to the signing of the
Leone’s eight-year civil war. Although both sides committed
Lome Peace Accord and was aimed at increasing public supatrocities, the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) perport for the signing of the treaty. Since the signing in 1999,
petrated the most serious abuses, which included summary
the program has continued to educate the public about
execution, systematic rape and enslavement of women, use
basic human rights, and to increase support for the Lome
of civilians as human shields, abduction and use of child solAccords. The program has been tremendously successful
diers, wanton destruction of property, and limb amputain accomplishing its goals.
tion. The international community condemned the RUF’s
There can be little question that the UNDP-funded
widespread human rights abuses.
“National Awareness Raising Program” has been effective.
The situation in war-torn Sierra Leone exemplifies the dire
The effectiveness of the awareness program does, however,
need for a strong human rights institution. International suphave its costs: the monopolization of staffing and funds has
port for institutions such as Sierra Leone’s human rights comprecluded the Commission from carrying out other promission have positive and negative effects. As with the politgrams. Members of Sierra Leone’s NGO sector complain that
ical situation, the stability of Sierra Leone’s human rights
although the program has been helpful in educating indicommission has been tenuous. The predecessor to the curviduals about their rights, it has so overwhelmed the attenrent commission, the National Commission for Democracy
tions of the NCDHR staff members that they have been
(NCD), was established in 1994 by Sierra Leone’s then-milunable to focus much attention on the documentation of
itary government. The NCD’s independence, however, was
human rights abuses. In 1997 the Commission attempted to
severely undermined by provisions in its founding decree,
establish monitoring committees to document human rights
which stated that the organization could only perform funcabuses and advocate on behalf of
tions determined by the ruling
victims of human rights abuses.
party. Also, the NCD’s activities were
The following committees were
limited to promoting democracy,
proposed: police, prisons, women
educating the public about the
International funding should be tied to the
and children, and a general comconstitution, and encouraging
institution’s effectiveness in promoting
mittee. NCDHR even worked with
nationalism, patriotism, and loyalty
the UN Mission in Sierra Leone
to the state. Accordingly, the NCD
human rights, thus creating an incentive
to set up training for committee
undertook little human rights monfor effective human rights protection.
members. Despite initial enthuitoring, focusing almost exclusively
siasm, the efforts fell apart largely
on the transition toward a multibecause of a lack of focus on the
party democracy. In 1996 the elecpart of the NCDHR staff. Appartion of President Ahmar Tejan Kabbah re-established demoently, the NCDHR lacks the capacity to handle multi-oriented
cratic rule in Sierra Leone, and the NCD’s mandate was
programming.
modified to include human rights concerns.
As the situation in Sierra Leone demonstrates, it is critiThe re-named commission—the National Commission
cal that international support for national human rights
for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR)—was estabinstitutions be planned more effectively. It is also important
lished on December 23, 1996. In May 1997, however, the
to consider the context in which the international commuopposition Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
nity lends its support: international support for NCDHR’s
took power, suspended the constitution, banned political
work comes at a time when the organization still lacks many
activity, and announced rule by military decree, effectively
of the powers that are necessary for the effective functionsuspending the Commission’s work. The AFRC also joined
ing of a human rights institution. Although supporting such
forces with the RUF. Their nine-month reign was characa weak institution seems counterproductive, entirely cutteristically brutal and blatantly disregarded the rule of law.
ting off international support for the NCDHR simply because
In February 1998, the AFRC were ousted by the Economic
it is not as strong as it could be is the wrong response. The
Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring
international community might appropriately respond by
Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping forces, which re-instated
continuing to assist the NCDHR as it develops organizaPresident Tejan Kabbah. A period of war followed, with
tionally and structurally while simultaneously working with
atrocities on both sides. In July 1999, the two sides —
local actors to ensure political stability in Sierra Leone.
ECOMOG and AFRC— signed the Lome Peace Accord.
Second, international funding should be better coordiSince the signing of the accords, the NCDHR has been in
nated. While the UNDP was funding a large education project
a state of flux, with its fate being heavily debated even as
in Sierra Leone, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone was assisting
recently as early 2000. In its current state, the NCDHR lacks
with the establishment of human rights monitoring bodies. If
fundamental functions to ensure independence, such as the
both projects were coordinated more effectively, the UN
power to subpoena witnesses, and to compel documentation,
would have realized that the NCDHR staff would be unable
evidence, or records. The Commission also lacks the power to
to accomplish both tasks successfully. It was imperative, for the
institute proceedings or represent cases in a court of law.
success of the mission, for the UN to have developed an overNot surprisingly, the NCDHR is unable to rely on much suparching strategy for human rights promotion in Sierra Leone.
port from the country’s government, which must rebuild a devAs the experience of Sierra Leone’s commission demonastated economy and thus has little to contribute. In 1998 the
strates, the international community must coordinate and
Commission received a mere U.S.$6,300 from the governimplement its strategies more carefully if it is to help establish
ment, and since the war, it is unlikely the Commission will
effective national human rights monitoring bodies.
receive more funding. Thus, the NCDHR has had to rely
heavily on funding from the international community.
Funding and support from the international community
continued on next page
has been both effective and detrimental in Sierra Leone. The
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Conclusion
Despite numerous setbacks and uneven results in the
attempts of African nations to establish human rights institutions, there have been some positive developments, particularly within the last decade. Clearly, the increasing international commitment to the establishment of national human
rights bodies has raised the profile of human rights issues
within Africa, and has tied international legitimacy to the continent’s efforts to improve human rights protection.
On the other hand, the international community’s involvement in the establishment of these commissions has not
always been an effective way of promoting or protecting
human rights. The advice and funding given is often generic
and not tailored to a country’s particular needs. Further,
there tends to be little coordination between the various funding sources. As in Sierra Leone, this lack of coordination often
results in development and support for only one successful
project at a time, but no effective overall strategy.
The international community’s indiscriminate support for
all human rights commissions, regardless of their effective-

Afghanistan, continued from page 5

on mandates to study the broader context in which the
abuses occur and the structural elements of the government, security forces, and society that make patterns of violations possible. Analysis and reporting that could guide
government policy would be particularly relevant regarding
the violations against women’s rights.
A truth and reconciliation commission can serve an
important and necessary function in the nation building
process, particularly when there has been a stream of human
rights violations inflicted upon the population, as in
Afghanistan. This function is not a substitute for criminal
prosecution. In fact, a commission of inquiry into human
rights has worked well when implemented in tandem with
criminal proceedings by collecting testimony and documenting abuses later used in criminal prosecution cases.
Jirga
The traditional process by which Afghans have solved
issues ranging from local disputes to those of national importance has been through the Jirga (Assembly). Representatives
of tribes and communities gather to decide questions that
affect their families, villages, tribes, region, and nation.
Groundwork for a Jirga to address war crimes can be modeled after the arrangement made by the Bonn Agreement for
the convening of a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly). An independent commission of twenty-one constitutional and customary law experts has been charged with convening an
assembly for the purpose of selecting a transitional government. Similarly, a commission of international and customary law experts can be established to lay the framework
for accountability. Because representatives to the Jirga have
traditionally been male tribal elders, special attention will
have to be paid to the representation of women. One option
would be to establish a sub-commission to address the violence and abuses faced by women and girls.
Many advantages will result from domestic prosecution of
war crimes in an indigenous Afghan mechanism familiar to
the population. There will also be great need, however, for
24

ness, might suggest support for commissions that blatantly
fail to expose or protect against human rights abuses. As
Afronet Online, an African NGO based in Zambia, remarked,
“. . . [i]t would seem that pronouncements made loudly at
appropriate fora, coupled with structures put in place by
African governments, are part of the grand deception of their
people (and the international community) to give an impression of the improving human rights record in their respective countries.” Clearly, the international community does not
want to be seen as supporting attempts to overlook or conceal human rights abuses.
International donors and institutions must consider what
is needed to help countries develop institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. There is a need for
greater analysis of how international funding is being distributed, as well as the need for a more result-oriented process for
supporting effective national human rights bodies. 
* Mary Ellen Tsekos is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College
of Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.

outside support to ensure compliance with international
law standards. Because Afghanistan’s infrastructure has been
destroyed and its human and material resources depleted,
serious challenges exist for an exclusively domestic response.
Significantly, Annex II, point 6 of the Bonn Agreement
retains the right of the UN to investigate human rights violations and recommend corrective measures. The international community, particularly those non-governmental organizations that have been monitoring and documenting the
situation in Afghanistan, can play an essential role as advisors, experts, and investigators.
Conclusion
It is indisputable that Afghanistan must address severe violations of humanitarian and human rights law. Such a course
of action must be taken immediately, as the threat of war
criminals entering the transitional government and potentially destabilizing Afghanistan once again looms.
Each of the mechanisms discussed has an important role
to play in the effort to hold violators of humanitarian and
human rights law accountable while rebuilding Afghanistan.
Shared domestic and international cooperation is necessary to criminally prosecute those responsible for the most
egregious violations, such as massacres. Non-criminal sanctions can be employed to ensure that those culpable—even
if not prosecuted criminally—do not assume positions of
authority. A truth commission has the advantage of beginning promptly and moving the country toward reconciliation,
as well as compiling a historical record to prevent the past
from repeating itself. Ethnic minorities and women must
receive adequate representation and attention in these proceedings, as they have faced some of the most systematic and
widespread violence. Although challenges exist to attaining accountability, Afghanistan’s compliance with international and customary law standards and its realization of
sustainable peace and reconstruction requires the new government to meet the challenge.
* Ossai Miazad is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.

